A faint, light gray network diagram is visible in the background, consisting of interconnected nodes (circles and squares) and lines, suggesting a complex system or data flow.

**moz://a**

**Making HTTPS Revocations**


**Work - CRLite**

**Crypto Engineering**  
**MGoodwin, JCJ, DPatel**

# HTTPS Everywhere

## Percentage of Web Pages Loaded by Firefox Using HTTPS

(14-day moving average, source: [Firefox Telemetry](#))



**A certificate testifies the  
server is valid for  
website**

Certificates are supposed  
to be **revocable**

# Standard revocation forms:

**OCSP**

**CRLs**

# **CRLs**

**Large. Irrelevant Info.**

Firefox uses **OCSP** today


# **OCSP downsides:**

Privacy. Latency.

# 200 ms to first connection!

**Histogram Type** exponential  
**Ping Count** 299.02M  
**Sample Count** 9.97B  
**Sample Sum** 3.54T  
**Number of dates** 159  
**Selected Dates** 2018/06/26  
to  
2018/12/02

**5th Percentile** 29.08  
**25th Percentile** 90.72  
**Median** 195.23  
**75th Percentile** 409.76  
**95th Percentile** 1.18k



CERT\_VALIDATION\_HTTP\_REQUEST\_SUCCEEDED\_TIME


# CRLite: A Scalable System for Pushing All TLS Revocations to All Browsers

James Larisch\*    David Choffnes\*    Dave Levin†  
Bruce M. Maggs‡    Alan Mislove\*    Christo Wilson\*


\* Northeastern University    † University of Maryland    ‡ Duke University and Akamai Technologies

...compress and ship all  
**CRLs.**

# Cascading bloom filters



Certificate Transparency



CRLs



**Updates: 100s kB per day**

Replace OCSP for the  
common case

Better privacy

Better latency

**Doing it the Mozilla way**

# **CRLite**

Experiments in Nightly  
Beginning Q1

**moz://a** Crypto  
Engineering

:MGoodwin, :JCJ, :DPatel