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    <title>Insufficient.Coffee - pki</title>
    <subtitle>On a mission to solve communications security issues for the whole Internet. That, and drink coffee.</subtitle>
    <link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="https://insufficient.coffee/tag/pki/atom.xml"/>
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    <generator uri="https://www.getzola.org/">Zola</generator>
    <updated>2025-12-03T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
    <id>https://insufficient.coffee/tag/pki/atom.xml</id>
    <entry xml:lang="en">
        <title>Reflecting on 10 years of Let&#x27;s Encrypt</title>
        <published>2025-12-03T00:00:00+00:00</published>
        <updated>2025-12-03T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
        
        <author>
          <name>
            
              Unknown
            
          </name>
        </author>
        
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://insufficient.coffee/2025/12/03/reflecting-on-lets-encrypt/"/>
        <id>https://insufficient.coffee/2025/12/03/reflecting-on-lets-encrypt/</id>
        
        <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;My friend Christophe Brocas has just &lt;a rel=&quot;external&quot; href=&quot;https:&#x2F;&#x2F;blog.brocas.org&#x2F;2025&#x2F;12&#x2F;01&#x2F;ACME-a-brief-history-of-one-of-the-protocols-which-has-changed-the-Internet-Security&#x2F;&quot;&gt;published a retrospective on the ten years since we unveiled the ACME protocol to the world&lt;&#x2F;a&gt;. He interviewed me and some colleagues for the piece, and I recommend it!</summary>
        
    </entry>
    <entry xml:lang="en">
        <title>The State of CRLs Today</title>
        <published>2017-08-18T00:00:00+00:00</published>
        <updated>2017-08-18T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
        
        <author>
          <name>
            
              Unknown
            
          </name>
        </author>
        
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://insufficient.coffee/the-state-of-crls/"/>
        <id>https://insufficient.coffee/the-state-of-crls/</id>
        
        <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are a way for Certificate Authorities to announce to their relying parties (e.g., users validating the certificates) that a Certificate they issued should no longer be trusted. E.g., was revoked.&amp;hellip;
&lt;&#x2F;p&gt;
</summary>
        
    </entry>
    <entry xml:lang="en">
        <title>The end of SHA-1 on the Public Web</title>
        <published>2017-02-23T00:00:00+00:00</published>
        <updated>2017-02-23T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
        
        <author>
          <name>
            
              Unknown
            
          </name>
        </author>
        
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://insufficient.coffee/2017/02/23/the-end-of-sha-1-on-the-public-web/"/>
        <id>https://insufficient.coffee/2017/02/23/the-end-of-sha-1-on-the-public-web/</id>
        
        <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Our deprecation plan for the SHA-1 algorithm in the public Web, &lt;a rel=&quot;external&quot; href=&quot;https:&#x2F;&#x2F;blog.mozilla.org&#x2F;security&#x2F;2015&#x2F;10&#x2F;20&#x2F;continuing-to-phase-out-sha-1-certificates&#x2F;&quot;&gt;first announced in 2015&lt;&#x2F;a&gt;, is drawing to a close. Today a team of researchers from CWI Amsterdam and Google revealed the &lt;a rel=&quot;external&quot; href=&quot;https:&#x2F;&#x2F;security.googleblog.com&#x2F;2017&#x2F;02&#x2F;announcing-first-sha1-collision.html&quot;&gt;first practical collision for SHA-1&lt;&#x2F;a&gt;, affirming the insecurity of the algorithm and reinforcing our judgment that it must be retired from security use on the Web.</summary>
        
    </entry>
    <entry xml:lang="en">
        <title>Let&#x27;s Encrypt&#x27;s Growth to 10 Million Active Unique FQDNs</title>
        <published>2016-09-30T00:00:00+00:00</published>
        <updated>2016-09-30T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
        
        <author>
          <name>
            
              Unknown
            
          </name>
        </author>
        
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://insufficient.coffee/lets-encrypts-growth-to-10m-fqdns/"/>
        <id>https://insufficient.coffee/lets-encrypts-growth-to-10m-fqdns/</id>
        
        <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Yesterday Let&#x27;s Encrypt reached a new milestone: the unique set of all fully-qualified domain names in the currently-unexpired certificates issued by Let&#x27;s Encrypt is now &lt;strong&gt;10,022,446&lt;&#x2F;strong&gt;.&amp;hellip;
&lt;&#x2F;p&gt;
</summary>
        
    </entry>
    <entry xml:lang="en">
        <title>124 Days of Let&#x27;s Encrypt</title>
        <published>2016-04-05T00:00:00+00:00</published>
        <updated>2016-04-05T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
        
        <author>
          <name>
            
              Unknown
            
          </name>
        </author>
        
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://insufficient.coffee/124-days-of-lets-encrypt/"/>
        <id>https://insufficient.coffee/124-days-of-lets-encrypt/</id>
        
        <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;This is a quick status update from the &lt;a href=&quot;&#x2F;early-impacts-of-letsencrypt&#x2F;&quot;&gt;Early Impacts of Let&#x27;s Encrypt&lt;&#x2F;a&gt; post.&amp;hellip;
&lt;&#x2F;p&gt;
</summary>
        
    </entry>
    <entry xml:lang="en">
        <title>Service Assisted Communication and Simplifying a PKI</title>
        <published>2014-09-09T00:00:00+00:00</published>
        <updated>2014-09-09T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
        
        <author>
          <name>
            
              Unknown
            
          </name>
        </author>
        
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://insufficient.coffee/simplifying-pki-iot/"/>
        <id>https://insufficient.coffee/simplifying-pki-iot/</id>
        
        <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Because many of the devices in the IoT are headless and have limited ability to interact with their owners, there needs to be a way to authenticate them without passwords, and without the shortcomings of the existing &lt;a rel=&quot;external&quot; href=&quot;http:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Bluetooth#Pairing_mechanisms&quot;&gt;0000 and 1234 problems&lt;&#x2F;a&gt; in the Bluetooth world.</summary>
        
    </entry>
    <entry xml:lang="en">
        <title>Public Authentication</title>
        <published>2014-07-30T00:00:00+00:00</published>
        <updated>2014-07-30T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
        
        <author>
          <name>
            
              Unknown
            
          </name>
        </author>
        
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://insufficient.coffee/public-authentication/"/>
        <id>https://insufficient.coffee/public-authentication/</id>
        
        <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;The public authentication problem is one we have all learned to solve with intuition: &lt;em&gt;How do I decide to trust a new person?&lt;&#x2F;em&gt;&amp;hellip;
&lt;&#x2F;p&gt;
</summary>
        
    </entry>
    <entry xml:lang="en">
        <title>Prevalence of Well Known Peers in the Internet of Things</title>
        <published>2014-07-04T00:00:00+00:00</published>
        <updated>2014-07-04T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
        
        <author>
          <name>
            
              Unknown
            
          </name>
        </author>
        
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://insufficient.coffee/well-known-peers-iot/"/>
        <id>https://insufficient.coffee/well-known-peers-iot/</id>
        
        <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;The Internet of Things is imagined to be a interconnection of sensors and physical devices of all kinds into the world’s information systems: a collection of machine-to-machine communication devices used to gather and distribute information about the world, contrasted with the human-machine interactions making up the bulk of today’s Internet. The machine-to-machine model places new restrictions on the common practices for security, as the standard practice of user authentication becomes troublesome without the regular involvement of a user.&lt;&#x2F;p&gt;</summary>
        
    </entry>
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